



Hacking apple accessories to pown iDevices

Wake up Neo! Your phone got pown!

Mathieu RENARD - @GOTOHACK
mathieu.renard[-at-]gotohack.org



Who am I ?



@GotoHack

- DAY: Pentester & Team Leader
- NIGHT: Security Researcher

Area of expertise

- Mobility / BYOD
- Web application
- Embedded systems
- Hardware Hacking


Publications

- Les assises de la sécurité
 - To BYOD or not to BYOD
- GreHack 2012
 - Practical iOS Application Hacking
- HACK.lu 2012
 - Hacking iOS Application
- Hackito Ergo Sum 2013
 - Hacking apple accessories to pown iDevices

MFI Devices Invasion



iDevices Attack surface



iTunes Services



com.apple.mobilebackup & com.apple.mobilebackup2



Mobilebackup services

- Used by iTunes to backup the device

iDevice backup

- Permit a user to restore personal data and settings
- Abusing this service may allow an attacker
 - Retrieving personal and confidential data
 - SMS
 - Call Logs
 - application data
 - default preferences
 - data stored in the keychain (WiFi password, VPN Certificate Passwords).
 - Inject data to the device.
- Can be password protected

- # AFC (Apple File Connection)
 - Service running on all iDevices
 - Handled by `/usr/libexec/afcd`
 - Used by iTunes to exchange files
 - AFC clients can access certain files only
 - Files located in the Media folder



- # House_arrest
 - allows accessing to AppStore applications folders and their content.

- # Using an AFC client, a user/attacker can download the application resources and data (documents, photos...).
 - Including “default preferences”
 - File where credentials are sometimes stored.

Installation proxy

- Manages applications on a device
 - List installed applications.
 - Install an application on the device.
 - Upgrade an application on the device.
 - Uninstall an application from the device.
 - List archived applications.
 - Archive an application on the device
 - Creating a ZIP archive in the “ApplicationArchives” directory and uninstalling the application
 - Removes a previously archived application from the device
- Used by the `com.apple.mobile.house_arrest`
 - Enumerate and dump installed applications.

Diagnostics relay

- Allows requesting iOS diagnostic information.
- Handles the following actions:
 - Puts the device into deep sleep mode and disconnects from host.
 - Restart the device and optionally show a user notification.
 - Shutdown of the device and optionally show a user notification.
- Used by evasi0n to update some caches by rebooting the device.

File_Relay

- Allow paired devices to launch the following commands
 - AppleSupport,
 - Network,
 - WiFi,
 - SystemConfiguration,
 - VPN,
 - UserDatabases,
 - CrashReporter,
 - Tmp,
 - Caches
- All the files returned are stored in clear text in a CPIO archive
- Asking for UserDatabases allow retrieving
 - SMS, Contacts, Calendar and Email from databases in clear text.

Libmobiledevice

- Cross-platform software library
- Developed by Nikias Bassen
- Handles the protocols to support iDevices.
- Based on the open source implementation of usbmuxd

Pymobiledevice

- Lite python implementation
- Handles only most important protocols to support iDevices
- Based on the open source implementation of usbmuxd

Allows other software to easily interact with the services hosted on the device.

Summary



- # Communicating with the Device through the Sync port may allow malicious dock station to
 - Retrieve & Inject
 - SMS
 - Call Logs
 - application data
 - default preferences
 - data stored in the keychain (using backup)

Communicating with iTunes Services




USBmuxd and USBmux protocol

Client side communication



USBmuxd


- Daemon is started at system launch (on user system).
- Creates a listening UNIX Domain Socket at /var/run/usbmuxd.
- Wait for iDevice connections via USB
- Allows multiplexing of TCP connection over one USB pipe




Lockdownd binary

- Responsible for several tasks
 - Pairing,
 - Activation,
 - Unlocking FairPlay certificates,
 - Delegating communications to other services
 - ...
- Listening on port 62078
 - Accessed through the usbmux protocol.
 - Packets
 - Data length : 32bits big endian word
 - Data : XML plist
- **Only available after pairing.**
 - **First pairing require the device to be unlocked**

iTunes' service communication overview



Lockdown protocol & Pairing



Summary



- # Pairing is initiated on the USB Host side
- # Unlocking the device is mandatory



Reversing an Apple MFI accessory



Anatomy of an Accessory




MFI Alarm clock

- Apple dock connector
- Features :
 - Compatible with all iPods
 - Wake up to iPod
 - Full-function remote control
 - Charges iPod whilst connected



Opening the box...




**Power supply &
Audio Amplifier**

iDevice interface

Mother board

Mother board analysis





R8C/26 Group, R8C/27 Group
SINGLE-CHIP 16-BIT CMOS MCU


REJ03B0168-0210
Rev.2.10
Sep 26, 2008

In-System Programming
On-chip data flash (1Kbytes)
Internal ROM (32 Kbytes)




- NOTES:
- 1. P0_7 is an input-only port.
 - 2. Can be assigned to the pin in parentheses by a program.
 - 3. XCIN, XCOUT can be used only for N or D version.
 - 4. Confirm the pin 3 position on the package by referring to the package dimensions.

Not enough resources for hosting iPowN features




- NOTES:
- 1. ROM size varies with MCU type.
 - 2. RAM size varies with MCU type.
 - 3. XCIN, XCOUT can be used only for N or D version.

iDevice interface



Reversing the circuit



What about the Lightning connector ?




- # In October 2012 Apple released the Lightning
 - Apple proprietary bus and power connector
 - Replace its previous proprietary 30-pin dock connector.
 - Using 8 pins instead of 30
 - Significantly more compact than the 30-pin dock connector
 - Can be inserted with either face up.
 - Embeds an authentication chip inside the cable.
 - Analyzing the Lightning connector will not be so easy.

30 pins adapters

- *Allows to connect 30-pin accessories to devices featuring the Lightning connector.*
- *Successfully tested on the dock station used for our analysis*



Sniffing the communications



- # *Standard 8N1 serial protocol.*
- # *Data are sent @ 19200 bauds.*

Request/Response Structure



Request & Response Structure

Field	Size	Value
Header	2	0xff 0x55
Length	1	Size of Mode + Command + Parameter
Mode	1	The mode the command is referring to.
Command	2	The two bytes command.
Parameter	0..n	Optional parameter, depending on the command.
Checksum	1	0x100 - (sum of all length / mode / command / parameter bytes) & 0xFF

FF 55 03 02 00 80 7B 00 00



Play

- # Hacking the firmware of the μ C ?
 - Not relevant regarding our goal
 - We need some space to store user data...

- # Developing a custom dock ?
 - Challenging but too much time consuming regarding this study.
 - USB pins are not used
 - Allows connecting another device that share the same power supply

- # Hacking the dock and adding some hardware
 - The raspberry PI is meeting all our requirements
 - At least two USB ports
 - 1 to communicate with the connected device
 - 1 for a 3G / Wi-Fi adapter
 - 1 Ethernet port for debugging
 - GPIO (simulating user action on the dock)
 - Accepting 5V power supply.


Weaponizing an Apple MFI accessory




iPown Bill of materials




- # 1 Raspberry pi
- # 1 PodSocket
- # 1 PodBreakout
- # 1 USB Connector
- # 1 mini USB Connector
- # 1 WiFi USB Key
- # 1 SDcard




Hardware Hacking




Reversing the circuit




Enabling USB



Hacked MFI accessory



Hardware MiTM



Cheap ARM GNU Linux board

This dock station is now powered by





Demo



iPown

Personal Data dumper...



iPown

Personal Data dumper...



What if our alarm clock could silently jailbreak our device in our sleep when we are dreaming ?

iPown 2.0

Automating Jailbreak



Public Jailbreaks



jailbreakme.com

- Exploits by comex, Grant Paul (chpwn), Jay Freeman (saurik) & MuscleNerd
- Targeting MobileSafari
- Could be used against an unwitting victim
- Only working on old devices

Others other recent jailbreaks (absinthe 1&2, evasi0n)

- Require USB tethering.
- Require User interaction
 - iDevices refuse to communicate over USB if they are locked unless they have previously paired.
 - Lower security impact
 - only useful to the phone's owner

Are we really safe ?

User Interaction in evasi0n...



- # Pairing with the device
- # Starting com.apple.mobile.file_relay service
- # Retrieving the com.apple.mobile.installation.plist
 - plist file
 - caches the list of installed applications
- # Activating the apple "DemoApp.app"
- # Restoring Hijacked "DemoApp.app" in /var/mobile
 - Using old mobilebackup simlink trick
- # Updating the caches / Rebooting the device
 - "DemoApp.app" will show up on SpringBoard after restart"

Evasi0n Stage 2

- Injecting symbolic link 1/2
 - `/var/db/timezone -> 777 /var/tmp/launchd`
- Crashing lockdonwd 1/2
 - `Chmod 777 /var/tmp/launchd`
- Injecting symbolic link 2/2
 - `/var/db/timezone -> 777 /var/tmp/launchd/sock`
- Crashing lockdonwd 2/2
 - `Chmod 777 /var/tmp/launchd/sock`
- Waiting for user to launch the "DemoApp.app"
- Injecting the remount payload
- Uploading Cydia files

Executing "DemoApp.app" => Executing the remount script

```
#!/bin/launchctl submit -l remount -o  
/var/mobile/Media/mount.stdout -e  
/var/mobile/Media/mount.stderr -- /sbin/mount -v -t  
hfs -o rw /dev/disk0s1s1
```

```
<key>EnvironmentVariables</key>  
<dict>  
  <key>LAUNCHD_SOCKET</key>  
  <string>/private/var/tmp/launchd/sock</string>  
</dict>
```

- Launchctl interfaces with launchd to load, unload daemons/agents
- launchd's IPC mechanism operates through Unix domain sockets.
- LAUNCHD_SOCKET
 - Informs launchctl how to find the correct launchd socket
- Launchd runs as root and here launchctl runs as mobile
 - The socket and the demon launchctl have been chmoded 777
 - Our mobile now able to communicate with the root user's launchd

- # launchd (running as root) execute the remount script
- # No mount point is specified in the script
 - The kernel use the script name as mount point
 - Generating errors messages on stderr
 - The size of mount.stderr growing up
- # Evasion detects the "DemoApp.app" was launched
- # Injecting another set of files using backup
 - Restoring timezone directory
 - Replacing "DemoApp.app" binary by a symbolink link pointing to /
 - The kernel use the script name as mount point
 - The file system is successfully remounted in RW

- # Creating a directory at `/var/evasi0n` containing 4 files
 - `launchd.conf`.
 - List of subcommands to run via `launchctl` when `launchd` starts
 - Remounting the filesystem in RW
 - Loading `amfi.dylib` library
 - Executing the `evasi0n` binary
 - `amfi.dylib`
 - Loaded with `DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARY`
 - Contains only lazy bindings and no TEXT section
 - No TEXT/text section means that there is nothing to sign
 - Overriding `MISValidateSignature` in order to always return 0
 - Allowing unsigned code execution
 - `Evasi0n Binary` :
 - Executed with root privilege in the early boot environment.
 - Launches the kernel exploit
 - `Udid`
 - Contains the UDID of the current device

Reimplementing evasi0n

Modding evasi0n installer




- # Hijacking Music iPhone Application instead of "DemoApp.app"
 - Launched when connect the device is connected to a dock
 - Handle Remote accessory protocol
 - We can trigger the remount payload automatically
 - The payload can be triggered by the alarm



Simulating user action



Original Schematic



iPown Schematic





GOTO: HlaICK



Demo



Wake up Neo! Your phone got pwd...

Scenario



Room 1 : Victim



Room 2 : Attacker



Wake up Neo! Your phone got pwd...

Demo



Conclusion



iPown # Edition ???



**RECHARGEZ
VOTRE MOBILE
GRATUITEMENT**



Conclusion

- # Apple made the choice of user experience instead of security.
 - It is possible to build up a malicious device in order to get both the data and the control of iDevices.

"When things get up close and personal,
the rule is always better safe than sorry"



Don't connect your device to an untrusted dock station



And what about IOS7 ?



In iOS 7 Apple Fix this attack vector





Thank you for Listening Questions ?

mathieu.renard[-at-]gohack.org - <http://www.gohack.org>





Jan0 @planetbeing @pod2g
@MuscleNerd @pimskeks @ih8sn0w @i0n1c
@p0sixninja @saurik @Comex

Thanks to all members of the jailbreak community for sharing their work
and all of my friends who helped me to prepare this talk.

Don't learn to hack but hack to learn !