



Leanear

Trusting the Cloud

Cécile Delerablée (CEO)

Copyright © 2022 Leanear SAS

Our DNA

Leveraging expertises in [Cryptography](#) and [Operational Security](#) to tackle hard tech challenges and durably address customer concrete problems.



The Team

Backed by



Cécile Delerablée, PhD
CEO
(ENS, Orange, CryptoExperts)



Yohann Thomas, PhD
CTO
(Orange, ANSSI)



Lénaïck Gouriou
PhD Student
(ENS)



Pierre Hardy
Lead Software
(Sopra, ANSSI)




Bérénger Rosat
Lead DevOps
(Cassidian, ANSSI)



Cloud (R)Evolution...

► More and more data




DATA
is the new
OIL



► More and more value

► Less and less control




...Cyberattacks Explosion

2021 Highlights




Number of victims whose data was posted on leak sites:
+85% to 2,566 organizations



Cyber extortion ecosystem:
emergence of **35** new ransomware gangs



Frequency of ransomware attacks:
11 seconds (40 seconds in 2016)



Average ransom demand:
+144% to \$2.2 million

Source: Palo Alto Networks - Unit 42, 2022 Ransomware Threat Report



Data security is needed more than ever

Perimeter Security




Zero Trust

Data Centric Security

Privacy by Design

Privacy by Default




Solution: End-to-End Encryption (E2EE)

E2EE allows communications where only communicating users can read the content. It aims to **prevent potential eavesdroppers**⁽¹⁾ from being able to access the content (i.e the cryptographic keys needed to decrypt the content).

A technical means to address issues related to **regulatory compliance, data leaks, data sovereignty,** and more generally to **data protection.**

Related concepts / principles: **Data-Centric Security, Privacy by Design, Zero-Trust, Web3.**



⁽¹⁾ including telecom providers, Internet providers, malicious state bodies, and even the provider of the communication service



« Not Data Centric » Solutions

- VPNs
- Peer2Peer communications



E2EE: easily applicable
to chat¹, but...
Hard to generalize



⁽¹⁾ E2EE has become the norm for instant messaging applications (Signal, Whatsapp, etc.)





Our mission: bringing E2EE¹ generalization




⁽¹⁾ E2EE: End-to-end Encryption




Back to the 70's




Symmetric Encryption



Asymmetric Encryption



Hybrid Encryption



KEM: Key Encapsulation Mechanism


DEM: Data Encapsulation Mechanism




In the 2000's



Evolutions



Traditional Primitives



Traditional Primitives

Security

ex: Post-Quantum resistance

Efficiency


Keys size

Output size

Computing efficiency



Protocols



DH, TLS

Diffie–Hellman key exchange

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Diffie–Hellman key exchange^[nb 1] is a [method](#) of securely exchanging [cryptographic keys](#) over a public channel and was one of the first [public-key protocols](#) as conceived by [Ralph Merkle](#) and named after [Whitfield Diffie](#) and [Martin Hellman](#).^{[1][2]} DH is one of the earliest practical examples of [public key exchange](#) implemented within the field of [cryptography](#).

Transport Layer Security

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is a [cryptographic protocol](#) designed to provide communications security over a computer network. The [protocol](#) is widely used in applications such as [email](#), [instant messaging](#), and [voice over IP](#), but its use in securing [HTTPS](#) remains the most publicly visible.




2004: OTR

Off-the-Record Communication, or, Why Not To Use PGP

Nikita Borisov
UC Berkeley
nikitab@cs.berkeley.edu

Ian Goldberg
Zero-Knowledge Systems
ian@cypherpunks.ca

Eric Brewer
UC Berkeley
brewer@cs.berkeley.edu



2005: SAS

Ensuring the link between a cryptographic identity and a human being


Secure Communications over Insecure Channels Based on Short Authenticated Strings

Serge Vaudenay


EPFL



Advanced Primitives



Computing




Computing

- Searchable Encryption (SE)
- Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC)
- Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)





Access Control



Traditional Paradigm

1 encryption key \Leftrightarrow 1 (unique) decryption key




Various Access Policies

- 1 over n (inclusive / exclusive)
- Matching identity, hierarchical position, attributes, threshold...



Broadcast Encryption

1 encryption key \Leftrightarrow Multiple decryption keys



Some Technical Elements



El Gamal Encryption (KEM)

- Public key: $g, y = g^x$
- Secret key: x
- Encryption:
 - $C = y^r$
 - $K = g^r$
- Decryption: $K = C^{\frac{1}{x}} = g^{x \cdot r \cdot \frac{1}{x}} = g^r$



Underlying problem examples

Inverse problem

- Given: g, g^γ
- Find: $g^{\frac{1}{\gamma}}$



Underlying problems examples

Hard problem with multiple solutions

- Given: $g, Y = g^\gamma$
- Find: (x, A) such that $A = g^{\frac{1}{\gamma+x}}$

Verifiable Property

- Bilinear map: e such that $e(g^x, g^y) = e(g, g)^{x \cdot y}$
- (x, A) verifies: $e(A, Y) \cdot e(g^x, g) = e(g^{\frac{1}{\gamma+x}}, g^\gamma) \cdot e(A^x, g) = e(g, g)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma+x} + \frac{x}{\gamma+x}}$
 $= e(g, g)$



Lots of other problems
Lots of Primitives



Some of Our Results


- Cécile Delerablée, Pascal Paillier, David Pointcheval:
Fully Collusion Secure Dynamic Broadcast Encryption with Constant-Size Ciphertexts or Decryption Keys (2007)
- Cécile Delerablée:
Identity-Based Broadcast Encryption (2007)
- Cécile Delerablée, David Pointcheval:
Dynamic Threshold Public-Key Encryption (2008)
- Cécile Delerablée, Lénaïck Gouriou, David Pointcheval:
Key-Policy ABE with Delegation of Rights (2022)



Learn more?

Cécile Delerablée, CEO

cd@leanear.io





Leanear

Trusting the Cloud

Cécile Delerablée (CEO)

Copyright © 2022 Leanear SAS